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Abstract
Modern-day malware is intelligent enough to hide its presence and perform
stealthy operations in the background. Advance Persistent Threat (APT) is one such
kind of malware attack on sensitive corporate and banking networks to stay there
for a long time undetected. In real-time corporate networks, identifying the pres-
ence of intruders is a big challenging task for security experts. Recent APT attacks
like Carbanak, The Big Bang, and Red Echo attack (targeting the Indian power
sector) are ringing alarms globally. New data exfiltration methods and advance-
ments in malware techniques are the two main reasons for rapid and robust APT
evolution. Although many traditional and hybrid methods are available to detect
this stealthy malware, the number of target-specific attacks are increasing rapidly at
global level. Attackers have been crafting payloads resistant to malware sandbox
environments so that traditional sandboxing techniques may not work with these
APT malware detection. In this paper, we shed light on various Data Mining,
Machine Learning techniques and frameworks used in both Attribution and Detec-
tion of APT malware. Added to this, our work highlight GAP analysis and need for
paradigm shift in existing techniques to deal with evolving modern APT malware.
Keywords: APT, Targeted Malware, Data Exfiltration, APT Attribution
1. Introduction
Recent advances in the design of sophisticated malware tools are posing a
significant challenge not only to the global IT industry but also to the banking and
security organisations. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a key player in highly
targeted and sophisticated state-sponsored attacks [1]. These APT groups design
and deploy malware in a unique way depending on the target. After selecting the
targeted organisation, they come with different Tools, Techniques and Procedures
(TTP) to bypass the traditional line of defences (intrusion detection systems or
firewall). Once they get access, these APT groups stay inside targeted networks for
a long time to observe the workflows. These APT groups use intelligent multi-stage
malware deployment techniques to stay low under the radar for a long time [2].
Finally, gathered sensitive information is pushed in small chunks to its external
control and command servers (C2C) using some clever exfiltration techniques.
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The whole process of the APT life cycle is broadly divided into seven different
phases as shown in Figure 1 [3]. In the Reconnaissance phase, the attacker chooses
the target network and studies the internal network structure and comes up with
the necessary strategy, TTP, to bypass the initial layer of defence. Reconnaissance is
followed by the Initial compromise phase, where attackers exploit open vulnerabil-
ities to get an initial foothold into the targeted network. After that, the attackers try
to replicate and propagate into another machine and establishes backdoors to pull
more sophisticated payloads in Establishing foothold phase. Later in the Lateral
movement phase, attackers escalate various privileges to perform more sophisti-
cated tasks to hide its traces. In this particular phase, attackers traverse from one
network to another network in search of sensitive information. After collecting the
necessary data, the attackers strategically centralises this collected data to staging
servers. In the data exfiltration phase, attackers use different custom encoding and
encryption mechanisms to push these collected data to external control and com-
mand servers. Finally, to preserve the anonymity of the process, attacker leaves no
traces by clearing the tracks and creates a backdoor to revisit that particular orga-
nisation in the future.
APT has grown to become a global tool for cyber warfare between countries.
Carbanak APT campaign infected thousands of people worldwide and caused nearly
$1 billion damage across the globe [4]. APT actors carried out a variety of actions in
this operation, including opening fraudulent accounts and employing bogus ser-
vices to obtain funds, as well as sending money to cybercriminals via the SWIFT
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) network. Simi-
larly, in 2018, Big Bang APT developed a much more robust and sophisticated
multi-stage malware targeting the Palestinian Authority [5]. This APT malware
includes several modules that perform tasks ranging from obtaining a file list,
capturing screenshots, rebooting the machine, retrieving system information, and
self-deletion. More recently, a supply chain attack on solar winds by the Russian
APT group was considered one of the sophisticated attacks. RefreshInternals()
method in solar winds attack depict the maturity of these state-sponsored APT
groups in terms of malware design and payload delivery [6].
Figure 1.
APT life cycle phases.
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In order to deal with these kinds of state-sponsored targeted attacks, security
experts consider APT attribution and detection as two key pillars. Attribution is an
analysis process that explains about “who” is behind particular cyber espionage and
“why” they have done it [7]. This process gives insights about particular APT threat
actors and their targeted areas as well. Based on this preliminary information, the
security community try to detect these attacks by fixing issues at different levels of
an organisation. Since APT attribution and detection became crucial for many
security firms/govt agencies, both these processes require massive data pre-
processing and analysis. To address these issues, researchers propose different data
mining and machine learning techniques in both attribution and detection as well.
In this paper, we discuss various data mining and machine learning techniques in
both detection and attribution of APT malware. In addition to this, we compare
different detection techniques, and we highlight research gaps among those tech-
niques which need to be addressed by the security community to combat this
sophisticated APT malware.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1. details APT overview and phases of
APT, followed by the need for data mining and ML techniques in both attribution
and detection of APT malware. Section 2. talks about the process of attribution and
different techniques proposed to perform APT attribution. Section 3. discuss about
various state of the art data mining and ML techniques proposed by the research
community in APT detection. Section 4. details research gap analysis followed by
conclusion and future scope.
2. Data mining and ML techniques in APT attribution
APT attribution is an analysis process that reveals the identity of the threat
actors and their motto through a series of steps [8]. First, security firms collect data
from different victim organisations by performing forensic analysis on the respec-
tive networks and collect different Indicators of Compromise (IOC). In general,
attackers repeat this pattern in several other organisations as well. Security firms
observe and analyse these repeated patterns in IOC and TTP’s together, and cluster
these combinations as intrusion sets. Performing data analytics on these intrusion
sets over a period will eventually reveal the threat actor and motivation behind the
attack as depicted in Figure 2, respectively.
2.1 DeepAPT: APT attribution using deep neural network and transfer learning
APT attribution is quite a challenging task to the security community because of
various reasons. Majorly, State-sponsored APTs are developed in the supervision of
different units and equipped with default Anti-VM and Anti-Debugging techniques
to obfuscate the payloads. This technique makes feature extraction extremely chal-
lenging to most security firms. In addition to this, APT malware samples are highly
targeted so that very few samples will be available for analysis purposes. In order to
Figure 2.
Overview of APT attribution process.
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address this issue, Rosenberg et al. proposed a technique for APT attribution by
using a Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifier [9]. In this research work, the
authors used 3200 malware samples for training DNN classifiers, 400 samples for
validation and 1000 samples for testing the model. All the APT malware samples are
executed in a cuckoo sandbox environment, and generated reports are used as raw
input in training the classifier. DNN is effective in learning high-level features on its
own from raw inputs. In order to train DNN models more effectively, in this work,
the authors removed top 50,000 frequent words from input features of all cuckoo
reports. So, DNN models take very uncommon words from all cuckoo reports and
build a much more effective model to perform APT attribution. This DNN archi-
tecture is a 10-layer, fully connected network (50,0000 neurons at the input layer
and 2,000 in the first hidden layer) with a ReLU activation function. The final
trained APT attribution model did decent work on test data with 98.6% accuracy.
Added to this, the authors also applied transfer learning on trained DNN models by
removing and retraining top layer neurons. After applying transfer learning, the
model still performs exceptionally well with 97.8% accuracy. From the t-distributed
stochastic neighbour embedding algorithm (used to reduce from 500 dimension
space to 2 dimension space), we can see that the trained model could separate
different APT malware groups as shown in Figure 3, respectively.
2.2 APT attribution based on threat intelligence reports
Most APT attribution techniques heavily rely on performing analysis for
malware samples used in that particular campaign. The key disadvantage of this
strategy is that the same malware samples can be used in several operations. In some
situations, APT groups specifically buy malware from the dark web based on their
requirements. So, the ML models constructed by only considering malware samples
may not give efficient results in terms of APT attribution. In order to address this
issue, Lior Perry et al. proposed a method named NO-DOUBT, i.e. Novel Document
Based Attribution, by constructing models on threat intelligence reports with the
help of Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques [10]. In this research, the
Figure 3.
2-dimensional visualisation of APT families using t-SNE algorithm [9].
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authors collected 249 threat intelligence reports of 12 different APT actors and
considered APT attack attribution as a multi-text classification problem. The pro-
posed model consists of mainly two phases, as shown in Figure 4. In the training
phase, labelled reports and word embeddings transform the input data to a vector
representation. For generating this vector representation, authors propose SMOBI
(Smoothed Binary Vector) algorithm, which will find cosine similarities between
input words in labelled data sets and word embeddings to form a huge n  m
matrix. This vector representation and labels are given to the ensemble xGBoost
classifier to construct a known actor model. In the deployment phase, new test
reports (unlabelled) are also converted to vector representation and given to the
known actor model to determine the probability predictions to the known classes.
These probability predictions are given to a New Actor Model (a binary classifier
that outputs whether it is a known APT actor or a new unknown actor) to make
final predictions. Although this model struggles to detect Deep Panda and APT29
actors, SMOBI based APT attribution outperforms previous text-based APT
attribution models (unigrams + bigrams and tf-idf) in terms of Accuracy, Precision
and Recall.
2.3 ML based attribution framework using high level IOC
Most of the APT attribution processes depend upon the manual analysis in victim
networks and collecting low-level indicators of compromise (forensic analysis at
firewalls, tracebacks, IDS and Honeypots). However, APT actors change this low-
level IOC from one organisation to another organisation. ML models built based on
this low-level IOC, results in inadequate cyber intelligence systems. On the other
hand, collecting high-level IOC’s for each organisation is time-consuming. Such high-
level IOC’s are published in the form of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports
across the organisations as a common practice. In 2019, Umara Noor et al. proposed a
distributional semantic technique of NLP to build a cyber threat attribution frame-
work by extracting patterns from CTI reports [11]. The proposed attribution frame-
work is broadly divided into three phases, as depicted in Figure 5. In this experiment,
authors used a customised search engine to collect 327 unstructured CTI documents
corresponding to 36 APT actors as a part of data collection phase. The CTI documents
do not contain the exact keyword described in the standard taxonomy due to varying
textual definitions and choices for communicating a concept. Rather than using a
Figure 4.
NO-DOUBT method for APT attribution [10].
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simple keyword-based search, the authors developed a semantic search method based
on the statistical distributional semantic relevance technique (LSA), to retrieve rele-
vant documents. The input CTI records are indexed using LSA. The statistically
derived conceptual indices (from LSA indexer) are searched for semantically relevant
topics using the high-level IOC labels specified in MITRE ATT&CK [11]. Based on
cosine similarity, the CTA-TTP correlation matrix is constructed in the CTI analytics
phase. ML models are built on top of the CTA-TTP correlation matrix in the Cyber
Threat Attribution phase. Among various classifiers, the Deep Neural Network
turned out to be the best performer with 94% attribution accuracy on test data with
high precision and recall values.
2.4 APTMalInsight: recognising APT malware based on system call
information and ontology framework
Behavioural analysis of APT malware gives better insights on both APT attribu-
tion and detection. Based on this motivation, Weijie Han et al. proposed that,
Figure 5.
Cyber threat attribution framework [11].
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dynamic system call information reveals behavioural characteristics of APT
malware [12]. Furthermore, the authors built an ontology model to understand in-
depth relation between the maliciousness of APT malware to its families, as
depicted in Figure 6. respectively. APTMalInsight framework mainly consists of
two modules i.e. APT malware family classification module and detection module.
The basic concept behind the APTMalInsight framework is to profile the
behavioural characteristics of APT malware. It obtains dynamic system call infor-
mation from the programs to reliably detect and attribute APT malware to their
respective families. Primarily, APT malware samples are executed to extract
dynamic API calls. After extracting API calls, authors calculated the feature impor-
tance of each API call and built a feature vector by selecting top N-API calls from
the API call sequence. ML models built on top of that feature vector will output the
APT attribution class for test data, as shown in Figure 7. For the experiment,
authors considered a total of 864 APT malware samples belonging to five different
families. As per the experimentation results, Random Forest turned out to be the
best model in terms of Accuracy(98%), Precision and Recall for APT malware
family attribution.
Figure 6.
APT malware ontology model [12].
Figure 7.
High-level overview of APTMalInsight framework [12].
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2.5 ATOMIC: FireEye’s framework for large scale clustering and associating
APT threat actors
Security firms like FireEye investigate many victim networks and collect IOC
and group them together as uncategorised (“UNC”) intrusion sets. Over time, this
type of UNC sets are increasing rapidly, and security firms need to either merge
these other APT groups or assign a new group name based on manual analysis.
FireEye security researchers proposed an automated framework with the help of
ML models to perform investigation, analysis, and rationale for the whole APT
attribution process [13]. In this framework, the researchers suggest a document
clustering approach using term frequency and - inverse document frequency
method (TF-IDF). The TF-IDF algorithm assigns more importance to a term if the
word often appears in the document. Similarly, if the term appears common across
all the documents, the algorithm decreases its importance. This method favours
unique terms like custom malware families, which may appear in just a few classes,
and downplays popular terms like ‘phishing’, which appear more often. After cal-
culating scores using the TF-IDF algorithm, each UNC group is converted into a
vector representation, and researchers calculate cosine similarity between these
APT groups as shown in Figure 8. respectively. As angle between the two vectors
decreases, they tend to become parallel. The decrease in the angle helps the
researchers to determine the extent of similarity between two different APT groups.
Based on this idea, FireEye automated the whole process of APT attribution and
merging different uncategorised groups.
3. Data mining and ML techniques in APT detection
Most of the APT families stay undetected for a long period and use intelligent
ways to damage the vulnerable hosts. When a traditional malware executes, most of
the events occur sequentially and leave some traces behind. These traces help
modern-day intelligent systems like SIEM, IDS, IPS to prevent these attacks. But,
when it comes to the case of APTs, they clean the attack traces and also prevent
sequence execution of events. Also, APT employs Anti-VM and Anti-debugging
techniques for making things harder for the detection systems. The hardness in
Figure 8.
Cosine similarity between different un-attributed APT groups [13].
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detecting the APT has made the cyber security enthusiasts draw their attention
towards this domain. Some of the important contributions in the research area are
mentioned below. A detailed comparison among different detection techniques are
illustrated in Table 1. respectively.
3.1 A novel deep learning stack for APT detection
Tero et al. [14] proposed a theoretical approach for detecting APT by developing
a stack of Deep Learning methods where each layer has a particular task in handling
APT events. The authors consider network payload and packet header information
as features, and they streamlined the input to the detection stack without any data
filtering mechanism. The detection stack is designed sequentially. The initial layers,
i.e. layer-1 and layer-2, are used to detect the known attacks and legitimate network
traffic from the data flow respectively. Layer-3 of the detection stack employs in
identifying the outliers having historical presence. It uses Recurrent Neural
Network-Long Short Term Memory (RNN-LSTM) units to confirm whether an
outlier has historical occurrence. Layer-4 helps to classify the outliers into four







[14] RNN-LSTM and GHSOM Network Traffic Flow Deep learning stack with sequential






Suspicious information flows are
identified using MITRE ATT&CK
framework.
[16] Directed Graph Mining
and One Class SVM





IDS Logs Identify correlation rules between
various system events to develop an
APT attack graph
[18] RNN-LSTM SIEM Event Logs Identify possible event codes and their
sequence to detect an APT attack in
realtime
[19] Ensemble Classifier Network Traffic Flow Separate threat detection sub-module
for APT life cycle phases.
[20] Multi fractal based error
minimization
Network Traffic Flow Multi fractal analysis to extract the
hidden information of TCP
connections.
[21] Correlation Analysis Multiple data sources Construction of Attack Pyramid using
multiple planes to detect APT
[22] J48 Classifier API log data API calls to track process injection and
privilege escalation activities.
[23] Ensemble Classifier Domain Names
(Alexa and data.
netlab.360)
Identify malicious C2C communication
using lexical features of domain names
[24] Ensemble Classifier Domain Names
(Alexa and
DGArchive)
Identify malicious C2C communication
using lexical, network features of
domain names
Table 1.
Comparison of different APT detection methods.
9
DMAPT: Study of Data Mining and Machine Learning Techniques in Advanced Persistent…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.99291
using an anomaly detection method named Growing Hierarchical Self-Organising
Map (GHSOM). The stack’s final layer helps to map the anomalies (i.e. intercon-
nections between the outlier events) using a Graph Database (GDB). The proposed
stack model is highly modular and was designed to perform dynamic detection of
APT events with a decent detection accuracy. However, this detection system is
complex in design and result in higher time complexity when dealing with massive
data inputs.
3.2 Real-time APT detection through correlation of suspicious information
flows (HOLMES)
HOLMES model of APT detection is strongly based on the principles of the APT
kill chain model. The cyber kill chain model gives a higher-level overview of the
sequence of events in successful APT espionage, i.e. reconnaissance, command and
control communication, privilege escalation, lateral movement, data exfiltration,
and trace removal. Audit data from various operating systems are converted to a
common data representation format and passed as input to the proposed model in
the initial step. Lower-level information flows are extracted from the audit data
such as process, files, memory objects and network information etc. The core part
of the proposed model is to map the lower-level information data flows to the
phases of the APT-kill chain by constructing an intermediate layer. The intermedi-
ate layer is responsible for identifying various TTP’s (Tools, Techniques, Proce-
dures) from the low-level information data flow that correlates with respective
phase of the APT life cycle. The authors considered around 200 TTP patterns based
on MITRE ATT&CK framework [15]. The TTP patterns and noise filtering mecha-
nism are employed in constructing a High-Level Scenario Graph (HSG) from which
we can detect the APT attack with decent accuracy.
3.3 Anomaly detection in log data using graph databases and machine learning
to defend advanced persistent threats
Schindler et al. proposed an APT detection engine based on the principles of
APT kill chain phases [16]. In this work, SIEM logs were considered as data source.
The correlation is identified between the event logs and the phases of APT kill
chain. An adapted kill chain model is constructed to identify the possible attack
vectors from the SIEM event logs. This model is implemented at two different
levels.
Level-1 deals with graph-based forensic analysis where logs from different pro-
grams are aggregated based on timestamp to identify events with in the network. A
directed graph is constructed from the multiple layers of event sequences. Each
event sequence reveals whether the event flow matches with the partial/full phases
of the APT kill chain.
Level-2 helps in identifying various anomalous activities using the Machine
Learning approach. An ML classifier is constructed to make the model robust in
detecting APT events along with the graph model. Authors considered “one-class
SVM” as the classifier model and used windows logs, firewall logs, file audit logs of
benign system programs as its data source. This model is expected to identify all the
events that differ from the benign programs.
The proposed model achieved a decent accuracy score of 95.33% in detecting
APT events. However, considering the case of smart malware where malicious




3.4 A study on cyber threat prediction based on intrusion event for APT attack
detection
Yong-Ho Kim et al. [17] proposed a theoretical model for APT detection that
consider intrusion detection system logs as data source. From the IDS logs, correla-
tion rules between various system events are identified to build an attack graph.
Identifying the correlation between the intrusion detection logs helps in predicting
the future attacks. In the initial phase, intrusion detection logs are collected and
corresponding intrusion events were extracted. The extracted events are passed to
different function blocks, each corresponding to a particular detection activity. One
of the functional block identifies the single-directional i.e. (host to C2C interaction)
and bi-directional (host to C2C, C2C to host) communication activities. Another
block identifies the repetitive intrusion events and combines them as a single event
to optimise the time and resource constraints. A correlation analysis block identifies
the context of intrusion detection events and creates sequential rules based on the
principles of 5 W and 1H (When, Where, Why, Who, What and How). Finally, the
prediction engine consider the attack scenario and tries to predict one or more
events that can occur after a single intrusion event. This module consider data
mining principles such as support and confidence to produce the best possible
result. The time constraint is one of the practical problems with this model, as some
of the functional blocks take a longer time to process events. Another important
aspect is that, rules of the intrusion detection systems will directly affect the out-
come of this model.
3.5 APT detection using long short term memory neural networks
Charan et al. [18] proposed an APT detection engine that takes SIEM event logs
as input and use LSTM neural networks to detect the successful APT espionage. The
author consider Splunk SIEM logs as a data source and streamline data to the
Hadoop framework to process and obtain the event codes for every activity. Based
on the APT life cycle phases, the author listed out the possible event codes and their
sequence, leading to successful APT espionage. The core part of this work is to
identify the event codes occurring in a sequence, and this process requires
memorising the previous state event codes. So, in the proposed model, LSTM (a
variant of RNN) is considered a classifier because it overcomes vanishing gradient
problem by remembering the previous state event codes to confirm APT attack
presence. However, this model may suffer from a high false-positive rate when
smart malware techniques are employed in crafting the APT attack.
3.6 MLAPT: detection of APT attacks using machine learning and correlation
analysis
APT detection research mainly rely on the analysis of malware payload used in
different phases of APT attack. This kind of approach result in high false positives in
case of multi-stage malware deployment. In order to address this issue, Ghafir et al.
proposed a model to detect multi-stage APT malware by using machine learning
and correlation analysis (MLAPT) [19]. The MLAPT system is broadly divided into
three modules, i.e. 1) Threat detection module, 2) Alert correlation module and 3)
Prediction module. Initially, network traffic is passed to the Threat detection mod-
ule in which authors built several submodules to detect multi-stage attacks. The
Output alerts from the Threat detection module are passed to the Alert correlation
module. Alert correlation module filters redundant alerts and clusters these alerts
based on correlation time interval. The correlation indexing sub-module determines
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a given scenario is either a full APT scenario or sub-APT scenario based on alert
correlation score. The prediction module consider sub APT scenarios and predict its
probability of becoming a full APT scenario. Based on that prediction module, alerts
are escalated to the network security team to stop this APT kill chain. The novelty of
this research lies in the detection of APT across all life cycle phases. Added to this,
the MLAPT system monitors and detects real-time APT attacks with a decent 81%
Accuracy.
3.7 Detection of APT attacks using fractal dimensions
Detecting APT network patterns is a complex task as it tries to mimic the behav-
iour of regular TCP traffic. APT malware opens and closes TCP connections to its
C2C servers like any other regular legitimate connection with a minimal data transfer
to stay low under the radar. Single scale analysis does not extract the complexities of
this kind of APT traffic and lowers the detection accuracy. Researchers found that
current supervised ML models use euclidean based error minimization, which results
in high false positives while detecting complex APT traffic. To address these issues,
Sana Siddiqui et al. proposed an APT detection model using multi-fractal based
analysis to extract the hidden information of TCP connections [20]. Initially, the
authors considered 30% of labelled datasets and computed prior correlation fractal
dimension values for normal and APT data points. Both these computed values are
loaded into the memory before processing the remaining 70% unlabelled dataset.
Each point in the remaining 70% dataset is added to both normal and APT labelled
dataset, and posterior fractal dimension values are calculated in the next step. The
absolute difference between prior and posterior values for both regular and APT
samples are calculated to determine the closest cluster to the data point. If fd_anom
(absolute difference between prior and posterior for APT sample) ≤ fd_norm
(absolute difference between prior and posterior for normal sample), then that data
point is classified as an APT sample and vice versa. As per the experimental observa-
tions, fractal dimension based ML models performs better in terms of accuracy
(94.42%) than the euclidean based ML models.
3.8 APT detection using context-based detection framework
Paul Guira et al. proposed a conceptual framework known as the Attack Pyramid
for APT detection [21]. In this approach, the goal of the attack (data exfiltration in
most of the cases) should be identified and placed on top of the pyramid. Further
more, the model identifies various planes such as user plane, application plane,
network plane and physical plane where the possibility of attacks are maximised.
From the proposed approach, one can identify the correlation between various events
across different planes. In general, an APT attack span multiple planes as the attack
life cycle progresses. So, it is possible to identify the attack contexts that span through
multiple attack planes. Events from different sources, i.e. VPN logs, firewall logs, IDS
logs, authentication logs, system event logs are passed as data source to the detection
engine. From these logs, the context of attack is identified using correlation rules. In
the next step, the suspicious activities are identified by matching the attack contexts
using a signature database. This model requires updating signatures at regular inter-
vals to identify new attack contexts in real-time scenarios.
3.9 APT detection system based on API log data mining
Chun-I Fan et al. [22] proposed a generalised way for APT detection using
system calls log data. The model was built based on the principles of dynamic
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malware analysis where API call (system call) events were passed through a detec-
tion engine. The novelty of this work lies in the approach of handling the API calls.
Modern APT malware is often used to create child processes or inject code into a
new process to evade detection. Authors have created a program named
“TraceHook” that monitors all the code injection activities. Tracehook outputs the
API count for the executable samples (benign/malware), and a machine learning
classifier model is constructed on top of the obtained API count values. The pro-
posed model considers only six important DLLs to monitor and can be combined
with other APT detection models to build a robust APT detection engine.
3.10 Ensemble models for C2C communication detection
Identifying and stopping a particular life cycle event can break the full APT
cycle and minimise damage to a considerable proportion. Based on this idea,
researchers proposed various methods to stop malicious C2C communication.
Modern-day malware employed a new way to communicate with their C2C server
with the help of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). DGA creates a dynamic list
of domain names in which a few domain names are active for a limited amount of
time. So, the malware communicates to a different C2C domain name for every
successful communication. This practice helps the smart malware to avoid detection
from the traditional antivirus, firewalls, and other network scanning software.
Anand et al. [23] proposed a classification technique to detect character-based
DGA, i.e. domain names are constructed by concatenating characters in a pseudo-
random manner, for example, wqzdsqtuxsbht.com. In this method, author
extracted various lexical-based features such as n-grams, character frequencies, and
statistical features to build an ensemble classifier. The proposed model can detect
character-based DGA domain names with a decent accuracy score of 97%. Charan
et al. [24] proposed a similar technique to detect word-based DGA domain names
where domain names are constructed by concatenating two or three words from
dictionaries, for example crossmentioncare.com. In their model, the author con-
sider lexical, statistical, network-based features to build an ensemble classifier. A
combination of the above two models can detect the C2C communication activity
with a decent accuracy.
4. Conclusion and future scope
Although the security community propose different techniques to detect APT
malware, there is a clear gap between current detection mechanisms and APT
groups evolution. APT attack detection is extremely difficult due to an
unavailability of benchmark datasets for training and evaluation. Added to this,
constant change in TTP usage by APT groups result in high false positives in terms
of detection. Due to the persistent nature of APT campaigns, it is cumbersome to
capture the data over a long period of time. This raises the issue of storing and
processing such large amounts of data so that real time detection is still a challeng-
ing task to the security community. Many state of the art APT detection models can
be bypassed using modern Load Off Land Binaries (LolBins) and process injection
through fileless malware. Lately, targeted APT malware evolved into a new variant
named smart malware which is highly modular, robust and intelligent enough to
evade detection from state of the art ML techniques. Along with these issues,
adversarial machine learning is a potential threat to the existing detection mecha-
nisms. Some of the APT groups also started using GAN to modify the payloads in
such a way to evade detection and attribution as well. In order to address these
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serious security concerns in APT detection and attribution, there is a need for
benchmark datasets and robust ML models working at different levels of the APT
kill chain.
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